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A FATHER'S RIGHT TO VISIT HIS ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965)
Wallace v. Wallace, 60 Ill. App. 2d 300, 210 N.E2d 4 (1965)
In considering a putative father's right to visit his illegitimate child two
recent cases have reached conflicting results. Wallace v. Wallace1 is unique
in that the father brought an action based upon the child's alleged right to
his father's companionship and support instead of the father's right to obtain
either custody of the child or visitation rights. In deciding that the complaint
did not state a cause of action, the court held as a matter of law that the
father, in bringing the action in the name of the illegitimate child, was merely
attempting to by-pass the clear legislative intent 2 that the father of an illegit-
imate child should have no rights whatsoever to his companionship and held
that such an attempt could not prevail.3
In Commonwealth v. Rozanski,4 a father directly asserted by petition
his rights of visitation with his illegitimate son. The County Court of
Philadelphia granted the father temporary visitation rights, concluding that
such rights would be more beneficial than harmful to the child even though
the mother opposed visitation and stated an intention to marry another man
in the future and the Superior Court of Philadelphia affirmed.5 The court
noted its recent decision of first impression in Pennsylvania, Commonwealth
ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley,6 which held that a father may never be
granted the privilege of visiting his illegitimate child when it is in the mother's
custody, for such is to be conclusively presumed detrimental to the child's
welfare. However, in Rozanski the superior court expressly overruled its
previous decision, concluding that the criteria for determining a putative
father's right to visit his illegitimate child are the child's welfare and best
interests, an issue dependent on the particular facts of each case. In finding
visitation in the child's best interests on Rozanski's facts, the court expressed
the opinion that the father had formerly contributed much to the child's
development and apparently would do so in the future.
The decision in Rozanski is expressive of the evolution of the father's
right to custody of his illegitimate child as well as the father's right to
visitation. The ancient common law rule placed custody of an illegitimate
child in the hands of the parish, which evolved to an exclusion of its supposed
1 60 Ill. App. 2d 300, 210 N.E.2d 4 (1965).
2 The court cited a portion of the Ill. Paternity Act which says:
A person charged or alleged to be the father of a child born out of wedlock,
whether or not adjudicated the father under this Act, shall have no right to the
custody or control of the child except such custody as may be granted pursuant
to an adoption proceeding initiated by him for that purpose.
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106 3/4 § 62 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
3 Wallace v. Wallace, supra note 1.
4 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965) (4-3 decision).
5 Ibid.
6 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965).
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father from custody, giving the mother the exclusive right.7 However, the
right to custody was later extended to the father in many common law
jurisdictions.8 The predominant rule in custody cases involving legitimate
children, that the child's best interests govern the custody award, has been
extended to include illegitimate children in most jurisdictions9 The question
of the child's best interests is one of fact.10 When the contention for the
child is between the father and mother, or between them and a third person,
or between strangers, the character of the applicant, the child's age, health,
sex, the comparative moral or immoral surroundings of its present or pro-
jected life, the relative benefits of education and development and pecuniary
prospects, and other similar considerations enter into the judicial determina-
tion.1 Influence and protection afforded by parental affection will be con-
sidered.' 2 Finally, the child's preference may be considered in determining
the child's best interests.13 Thus in making a custody award, the judge will
be guided primarily by what appears to be for the present and future best
interests of the particular child in respect to his temporal, mental, and moral
welfare. 14 However, as between the father and mother of an illegitimate child
the usual presumption is that the mother is entitled to its custody or control.' 5
The putative father is usually entitled to its custody or control against all but
the mother, if he is competent to care for and suitable to take charge of the
child and if it appears that the best interests of the child would be served.16
As the superior court in the Rozanski case noted, the right of a father to
visit an illegitimate child has not been considered as extensively as the right
of the father to the custody of his illegitimate child. Five states have allowed
visitation rights: New Jersey,1 7 New York,'8 California,1 Oklahoma,2 0 and
7 See Fladung v. Sanford, 51 Ariz. 211, 215, 75 P.2d 685, 686 (1938).
8 See, e.g., Fladung v. Sanford, 51 Ariz. 211, 75 P.2d 685 (1938); French v. Catholic
Community League, 69 Ohio App. 442, 44 N.E.2d 113 (1942); Commonwealth ex rel.
Human v. Hyman, 114 Pa. Super 64, 63 A.2d 447 (1949).
0 See, e.g., Waldron v. Childers, 104 Ark. 206, 148 S.W. 1030 (1912); Browning v.
Humphrey, 241 N.C. 285, 84 S.E.2d 917 (1954); Jensen v. Earley, 63 Utah 604, 228 Pac.
217 (1924).
10 Commonwealth v. Rozanski, supra note 4.
11 Sanders v. Sanders, 232 S.C. 625, 103 S.E.2d 281 (1958); State ex rel. Harmon v.
Utterbach, 144 W. Va. 419, 108 S.E.2d 521 (1959).
12 Barnett v. Barnett, 158 Okla. 270, 13 P.2d 104 (1932).
13 Lutke v. Lutke, 198 Okla. 131, 176 P.2d 496 (1947).
14 Holdeman v. Holdeman, 191 Okla. 309, 129 P.2d 585 (1942).
15 Deiler v. State, 22 Ind. App. 383, 53 N.E. 850 (1899); State v. Nestaval, 72 Minn.
415, 75 N.W. 725 (1898).
1 Garrett v. Mabaley, 199 Ala. 606, 75 So. 10 (1917); Dodge County v. Kemnitz, 32
Neb. 238, 49 N.W. 226 (1891).
17 Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq. 135, 85 AUt. 816 (1913).
18 People ex rel. Francois v. Ivanova, 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 221 N.Y.S.2d 75 (1961);
In re Anonymous, 12 Misc. 2d 211, 172 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1958); People ex rel.
Mahoff v. Matsoui, 139 Misc. 21, 247 N.Y.S. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
19 Strong v. Owens, 91 Cal. App. 2d 336, 205 P.2d 48 (1949).
20 Ex parte Hendrix, 186 Okla. 712, 100 P.2d 444 (1940).
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Alabama.2 ' The courts in New Jersey, California, Oklahoma, and Alabama
have seemingly taken the approach that the father is entitled to visit his ille-
gitimate child as a matter of right, placing the burden of proof that such
rights were not in the child's best interests upon the party contesting the
visitation rights of the father.22 In contrast, the approach of the New York
courts seems to allow such privileges only after the court has determined that
the privileges will be in the best interests of the child, an issue upon which
the father seeking visitation rights apparently bears the burden of proof.
23
The cases in the respective states have been unanimous in concluding that
when visitation rights and privileges are shown to be detrimental to the
best interests of the child, whose welfare is the paramount consideration,
they will not be allowed.24 But even if the father is allowed to visit his child
as a matter of right, the reasonableness and convenience of the times and
places is subject to the court's control.25
In Rozanski, however, the Superior Court of Philadelphia in considering
the visitation rights of a putative father was presented with two opposed
currents of judicial reasoning: its own recent precedent denying the father
all visitation26 and that from the vast majority of jurisdictions which allow
him custody and visitation under varying rules, standards, and circum-
stances.27 In fact, of the five states prior to Golembewski, which had specif-
ically considered visitation rights of a putative father, all had applied some
21 Bagwell v. Powell, 267 Ala. 19, 99 So. 2d 195 (1957).
22 In Baker v. Baker the New Jersey Court of Chancery stated that reasonable
visitation rights would be allowed unless the mother could prove that such rights would
be detrimental. Supra note 17. In Strong v. Owens the court allowed visitation privileges
at convenient times and said that no reasons for denial had been advanced. Supra note
19. In Ex parte Hendrix the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that since the trial court
failed to make an order concerning visitation rights, the illegitimate child's father, as such,
is entitled to have visitation rights at reasonable and regular times. Supra note 20. In
Bagwell v. Powell, supra note 21, the Alabama Supreme Court stated that a father has
a legal right to reasonable access if there is no showing that such right would be detri-
mental and cited Baker v. Baker and Strong v. Owens, supra notes 17 and 19. Thus, al-
though none of the four cases explicitly takes the position, it can be inferred from the
language in the respective cases that the burden of proof of showing that the allowance
of visitation rights would be detrimental to the child is upon the person opposed to the
father's visitation rights.
23 In People ex rel. Francois v. Ivanova the court stated that the best interests of
the child is the guiding principle in the determination of custody and the right of visitation.
The court noted that the trial court judge evaluated the character of the persons con-
fronting him and held extensive conversations with the parties and was able to form
estimations of their qualities before allowing visitation rights to the father. Supra note 18.
In In re Anonymous the court stated that the first concern was for the welfare of the
child and the court was not concerned with the determinative rights as between the parties.
Supra note 18.
24 See Ez parte Hendrix, supra note 20.
25 See authorities cited at notes 22 and 23, supra.
26 Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley, supra note 6.
27 See Note, 26 Albany L. Rev. 335, 336 (1962).
[Vol. 27
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
version of the best interests test and had allowed such rights. On the other
hand, only Illinois 28 had stated as a matter of law that a father is never
entitled to his illegitimate child's custody, conclusively presuming that such
custody is always detrimental to the child's best interests.2 9 Nevertheless,
Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley30 had declared a putative
father's rights of visitation with his illegitimate child detrimental as a matter
of law, the court finding any such rights in the father inconsistent with the
mother's exclusive right to custody as against the father,31 and with her
exclusive right to consent to adoption.3 2 More importantly, the court declared
itself concerned with the child's best interests rather than with the father's
rights; nevertheless, the court held that allowing the father to visit the child
would always be detrimental because such rights would remind the child of
his unfortunate state.
In overruling Golembewski and holding that the child's best interests
could be served by allowing visitation privileges, the superior court in
Rozanski noted the considerable precedent in favor of such rights and the
fact that the right of custody is provided the putative father in certain cir-
cumstances in Pennsylvania.33 Since the basis of the determination of the
father's right of custody is the child's best interests, the latter fact tended
to indicate that visitation rights, generally viewed as a form of custody,34
also could be in the child's best interests.
In the final analysis, however, the court's decision seems proper because
of numerous social and domestic reasons tending to refute soundly Golem-
bewski's legal principle that it is detrimental to an illegitimate child's welfare
to allow his father visitation privileges. The father may give to an illegiti-
mate child at an early age the natural love and affection that it should have,
and the child will be better able to bear his origin if he knows that he is
acknowledged to be on the same affectionate footing as other children.35
There may have existed between the father and the child close ties, the
disturbance of which could emotionally traumatize the child.36 Further, the
father should be able to impart to the child his character traits and to develop
interests in the child which the mother may be uninterested, unwilling, or
28 I1. Ann. Stat. ch. 106 3/4 § 62 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
29 Ibid.
30 Supra note 6.
31 The court noted that the putative father is entitled to custody of his illegitimate
child against all but the child's mother, for the mother has the right to the child's custody
as against the putative father. Supra note 6, at 103-04, 208 A.2d at 51.
32 The consent of the putative father had previously been required in an adoption
proceeding if he had acknowledged the child, Laws of Pa. 1925, No. 93, § 2(c), but this
statute was later amended and now requires only the consent of the mother. See Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 1 § 2(c) (1963).
33 Pote's Appeal, 106 Pa. 574 (1384); Commonwealth ex rel. Human v. Hyman, 164
Pa. Super 64, 63 A.2d 447 (1949).
34 See discussion and authorities cited at note 46, infra.
35 Commonwealth v. Rozanski, supra note 4, at 402, 213 A.2d at 157.
36 Ibid.
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incapable of developing, but only if such additions to the child's personality
would not be harmful.37 Generally, visitation privileges could establish or
strengthen an atmosphere of affection, security, and recognition of the child,
while providing him with the necessary guidance and supervision for personal
growth and development, and could help the child overcome the emotional
shock of his illegitimacy. In situations where these benefits can be demon-
strated it does not seem fair to punish the child by depriving it of such a
relationship with his or her father or the protection of the father when the
child is innocent of the guilt of the parent.3 8 In consideration of these argu-
ments and rationale, some of which the court noted, the court's conclusion
that visitation rights would not necessarily be detrimental to a child as a
matter of law appears sound and correct.
Wallace v. Wallace,39 conversely, confirms and extends a prior interpre-
tation of the Paternity Act:40 that Illinois has by statute returned to the old
rule of allowing the putative father no access or custody privileges whatso-
ever.41 This statutory provision has not always been the law in Illinois, for
in Wright v. Bennett 42 the circuit court stated that although the father of an
illegitimate child was not entitled to custody at common law, he was entitled
to such custody under the then-existing statute after giving the requisite
bond. In 1946 an Illinois appellate court reaffirmed this interpretation, al-
though the court held that the father was not entitled to custody in that
particular case because he had denied paternity of the child under oath and
had previously refused to contribute to its support.43
By the enactment of the present Illinois statutory provision "custody or
control" of an illegitimate child by the father was expressly denied; however,
visitation rights of the father were not.4 4 If the statutory words "custody"
and "control" are given their strict meanings, then the term "visitation rights"
does not appear necessarily related. A right to visit or have the companion-
ship of an illegitimate child does not necessarily result in the custody and
control of the child within the ordinary or plain meaning of those terms.
Therefore, even though the appellate court was obviously precluded from
allowing the father either control or custody of the illegitimate child, it was
not forced to conclude that visitation rights or privileges are a form or species
of "custody or control," and hence, the Paternity Act did not prevent the
court from allowing visitation privileges.
In the absence of any legislative history concerning the legislative in-
tent 45 it appears equally logical and plausible that visitation was not to be
37 Ibid.
38 People ex rei. Mahoff v. Matsoui, supra note 18, at 25, 247 N.Y.S. at 118.
39 Supra note 1.
40 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106 3/4 § 62 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
41 See Note, 46 IlR. L. Rev. 156 (1951).
42 7 Ml. 587 (1845).
43 In re Richards, 328 Ill. App. 591, 66 N.E.2d 512 (1946).
44 See Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106 3/4 § 62 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
45 The court apparently did not find any legislative history of § 62 of the Paternity
Act which expressed an intent to include "visitation rights" in the meaning of "custody
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included under "custody or control." There were valid reasons for distinguish-
ing between custody and control and visitation rights which did not neces-
sarily exist in previous cases holding that visitation rights were to be included
in the term "custody,146 for the purpose of allowing such rights. In concluding
that visitation rights were includable under "custody or control" the court
reached a result which was unjust to the father and the child, in contrast to
the effect of the opposite result reached in other jurisdictions.
Section 52 of the Illinois Paternity Act states that "the father of a child
born out of wedlock whose paternity is established in a proceeding under
this Act shall be liable for its support, maintenance, education and welfare...
to the same extent and in the same manner as the father of a child born in
lawful wedlock... .,47 Thus it appears that a father has duties to his illegiti-
mate child equal to those of the father of a child born in wedlock, but the
court holds that he may not even have the simplest of rights enjoyed by a
father of such a child.
It does not appear just that a father must be liable for the child's sup-
port, maintenance, education, and welfare and not able to visit or enjoy the
companionship of his illegitimate child. Without visitation privileges the
father is not able to protect the child from an unfit mother and to protect
his own interest in having his support money properly expended. Visitation
rights would allow the father to bring maternal incompetence or misbehavior
to the attention of the court in the absence of proper supervision by the offi-
or control," but apparently assumed that such an intent was obvious from the plain
meaning of the statutory language. Neither the court nor an article dealing with the sec-
tion of the act in question cited any legislative history affirming any such legislative
intent. See Note, supra note 41. The cited article's conclusion concerning the statute is
merely that the father has no right to custody and control under the statute, and there
was no attempt to consider visitation rights separately from that question; in fact visita-
tion rights as such were not mentioned. There is precedent for separating the questions.
See Baker v. Baker, supra note 17. However, the cited article does find that the statute
in question was passed to make for consistency with the policy of concealing illegitimacy
in the consent-to-adoption laws. It thus seems likely that the legislature was not thinking
of a putative father's visitation rights with an illegitimate child in its mother's custody.
46 There are several state cases which do interpret the term, and all unanimously
concur that the visitation rights of a father are a form of custody. In Davis v. Davis, 212
Ga. 217, 91 SX..2d 487 (19S6), the court said:
The right to determine whom the child shall visit and associate with and when,
where, and how often these visits and association shall take place is an in-
separable and inalienable ingredient of the right of a parent to the custody and
control of a minor child. Id. at 220, 91 SX..2d at 490.
Three cases in the New York lower courts have reached an identical conclusion, the
supreme court declaring in People ex rel. Hacker v. Strongson, 141 N.Y.S.2d 859, 860
(Sup. Ct. 1955), that visitation is a form of custody; in Ex parte People v. ex rel. Cox,
124 N.Y.S.2d 511, 515 (1953), that visitation is in substance custody pro tanto; and the
appellate division in People ex rel. Francois v. Ivanova, supra note 16 at 321, 221 N.Y.S.2d
at 79 (dissent), that visitation is a species of custody involving correlative control which
therefore interferes in the upbringing of the child.
47 Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 106 3/4 § 52 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965).
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cers of the court charged with such matters. Also it appears unjust to the
father to require him to support the child and deny him visitation rights when
there are no logical reasons or profound policy rationale for so doing. Visita-
tion rights elsewhere have not been considered detrimental to the child as
a matter of law and to argue that they are detrimental is both archaic and
irrational. New York, New Jersey, Alabama, California, Oklahoma, and
Pennsylvania have expressly granted the putative father visitation rights,
holding in numerous instances that visitation rights will be beneficial to the
child.48 Further a mother is not legally considered any less a mother in Illinois
if her child is born out of wedlock. Yet, the court, in denying visitation
rights to the putative father, has labeled him an incorrigible wrongdoer and
thoroughly punished him without any consideration of possible unequal treat-
ment of the equally guilty parents. Finally the court's decision was unjust
to the child. The father must not always be allowed visitation rights, but if
in a particular case the court finds they will be beneficial to the child, then
this denial deprives the child of a valuable benefit; thus the child will suffer
as well as the father.
The court in Wallace did not have to conclude that the Illinois legisla-
ture desired such an unjust result, and, in fact, courts usually and more prop-
erly interpret statutes to avoid such results. 49 Courts of various states have
interpreted custody to include visitation rights50 but these cases could have
have been reconciled on policy grounds. In fact, since other states do not
have a statutory provision which requires support of the child by the father
and also no right to custody or control 5' allowance of visitation rights would
seem even more important in Illinois; no other way exists to allow the father
to protect himself and his child. Further, it would seem ridiculous to deny
a father of an illegitimate child any possibility of visitation when he may
have a right to actual custody of the child in the state either by legislation
or by case law. But section 62 of the Paternity Act expressly denies the
putative father's right of custody; thus, the court in Wallace was not able
to utilize such rationale to allow visitation rights as were the courts of other
states. However, the court was not precluded from determining that visitation
rights are not a form of custody under section 62.
Support for the proposition that the court in Wallace improperly applied
the cases including visitation rights within the term custody is found in Zepeda
48 See authorities cited at notes 17-23, supra.
49 A statute must be given a reasonable construction, and, if one of two possible
interpretations gives an absurd or mischievous result the other interpretation should be
made. People ex rel. Barrett v. Thillen, 400 I1. 224, 231-32, 79 N.E.2d 609, 613 (1948).
The statute should receive a reasonable construction such as will effectuate the legislative
intent and as to avoid an unjust result. In re Bolter, 66 F. Supp. 566, 568 (S.D. Cal 1946).
A statute should be given a rational interpretation consistent with justice and common
sense. Brake v. Comptroller of City of New York, 278 App. Div. 317, 322, 104 N.YS.2d
774, 779 (1951).
50 See discussion and authorities cited at note 46, supra.
51 See Note, supra note 27.
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v. Zepeda,52 where an illegitimate child brought an action against the father for
damages and an Illinois appellate court, in explaining that being an illegiti-
mate child is not as detrimental as in the past, said:
In most American jurisdictions illegitimate children were also
treated harshly, but in recent years a more compassionate sense ofjustice has brought about the enactment of beneficent legislation
which has alleviated some of the oppression long visited upon these
unfortunates ... This liberalization is reflected in the statutes of
Illinois: an Illinois child has the right to his father's surname; either
or both of his parents may be compelled to support and educate him
until he becomes 18 years of age; his parents have custodial rights
... .53 (Emphasis added.)
Zepeda was decided in 1963 and interpreted the same statute as Wallace.
Although the judge's opinion as to the parents having custodial rights is
dictum, nevertheless, the judge believed that the father of an illegitimate
child has certain unspecified custodial rights even though the statute says
that a putative father may not have custody of such child. Obviously the
judge did not intend to imply that the father was to be allowed strict custody,
for such is expressly excluded by the statute. It does not appear that the
judge misinterpreted the statute for he does not say that the father was to be
allowed custody, but rather "custodial rights." The judge may well have
had in mind some form of visitation rights or companionship privileges.
Zepeda tends to show that the Illinois Paternity Act did not expressly or even
impliedly preclude the court in Wallace from concluding that putative
fathers have no right to visitation and companionship with their illegitimate
children.
Hence, the court's decision appears incorrect. If the court had considered
the benefits of visitation privileges to the illegitimate child, and endeavored
thoroughly to study the inherent nature and characteristics of visitation
privileges in relation to the decisions which determined that such are a form
of custody, it would have realized the necessity and logic in deciding that
in Illinois visitation rights are still available to a putative father.
52 41 IIl. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
G3 Id. at 256, 190 N.E.2d at 856.
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